? ? ? ?新冠病毒在全球蔓延，這次全球性的災(zāi)難是否會(huì)改變?nèi)蚧倪M(jìn)程，又將如何改變世界，美國(guó)《外交政策》（Foreign Policy）雜志邀請(qǐng)了來(lái)自世界各地的12位思想家談一談他們對(duì)疫情后全球秩序的預(yù)測(cè)，我們挑選了其中六個(gè)預(yù)測(cè)與大家分享：
1
A World Less Open, Prosperous, and Free一個(gè)開(kāi)放、繁榮與自由皆倒退的世界
by Stephen M. Walt
斯蒂芬·沃爾特
（哈佛大學(xué)肯尼迪政府學(xué)院貝爾?？茖W(xué)與國(guó)際事務(wù)中心教授）
The pandemic will strengthen the state and reinforce nationalism. Governments of all types will adopt emergency measures to manage the crisis, and many will be loath to relinquish these new powers when the crisis is over. COVID-19 will also accelerate the shift in power and influence from West to East. China, South Korea and Singapore have responded best. The response in Europe and America has been slow and haphazard by comparison, further tarnishing the aura of the Western “brand.”
新冠疫情將強(qiáng)化國(guó)家權(quán)力、加強(qiáng)民族主義。疫情之下，各種類型的政府都會(huì)采取緊急措施以管控危機(jī)。而當(dāng)這場(chǎng)危機(jī)結(jié)束時(shí)，它們中的許多將不情愿交出這些新得到的權(quán)力。新冠疫情也將加速權(quán)力和影響力由西方向東方的轉(zhuǎn)移。在這場(chǎng)疫情中，中國(guó)、韓國(guó)和新加坡應(yīng)對(duì)得最為出色，相比之下，歐洲和美國(guó)則反應(yīng)遲緩、應(yīng)對(duì)失策，這進(jìn)一步損害了西方的“形象”。
What won’t change is the fundamentally conflictive nature of world politics. Previous plagues—including the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919—did not end great-power rivalry nor usher in a new era of global cooperation. Neither will COVID-19. We will see a further retreat from hyperglobalization, as citizens look to national governments to protect them and as states and firms seek to reduce future vulnerabilities.
不變的則是世界政治最為根本的沖突本質(zhì)。以往的疫情（包括1918-1919年大流感在內(nèi)）并沒(méi)有終結(jié)大國(guó)間的敵對(duì)或者開(kāi)啟全球合作的新時(shí)代。本次新冠疫情也同樣不會(huì)。由于公民期待本國(guó)政府能夠保護(hù)他們、國(guó)家和公司會(huì)尋求降低未來(lái)的脆弱性，我們將看到當(dāng)前如火如荼的全球化進(jìn)一步消退。
In short, COVID-19 will create a world that is less open, less prosperous, and less free. It did not have to be this way, but the combination of a deadly virus, inadequate planning, and incompetent leadership has placed humanity on a new and worrisome path.
總之，新冠疫情將會(huì)創(chuàng)造出一個(gè)不再那么開(kāi)放、繁榮與自由的世界。事情本可以不必如此，但是致命病毒、計(jì)劃不周與無(wú)能領(lǐng)導(dǎo)這三者的結(jié)合已經(jīng)使人類走上了一條全新的、但卻令人擔(dān)憂的道路。
2
The End of Globalization as We Know It
我們所認(rèn)知的全球化終結(jié)
by Robin Niblett羅賓·尼布萊特（英國(guó)皇家國(guó)際事務(wù)研究所所長(zhǎng)）
The coronavirus pandemic could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back of economic globalization.
新冠疫情可能是壓垮經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的最后一根稻草。
The coronavirus pandemic could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back of economic globalization. Increasing public and political pressure to meet carbon emissions reduction targets had already called into question many companies’ reliance on long-distance supply chains. Now, COVID-19 is forcing governments, companies, and societies to strengthen their capacity to cope with extended periods of economic self-isolation.
中國(guó)不斷增長(zhǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事實(shí)力已經(jīng)激起了美國(guó)兩黨與其斗爭(zhēng)的決心。為實(shí)現(xiàn)碳減排目標(biāo)而施加的社會(huì)和政治壓力不斷增加，已經(jīng)使許多公司對(duì)長(zhǎng)距離供應(yīng)鏈的依賴受到質(zhì)疑。目前，新冠疫情正在迫使政府、企業(yè)和社會(huì)加強(qiáng)長(zhǎng)期應(yīng)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)孤立的能力。
It seems highly unlikely in this context that the world will return to the idea of mutually beneficial globalization that defined the early 21st century. And without the incentive to protect the shared gains from global economic integration, the architecture of global economic governance established in the 20th century will quickly atrophy. It will then take enormous self-discipline for political leaders to sustain international cooperation and not retreat into overt geopolitical competition.
在這樣的背景下，世界幾乎不可能回到21世紀(jì)初那種互利共贏的全球化狀態(tài)。一旦各國(guó)再無(wú)意愿保護(hù)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化所帶來(lái)的共同利益，那么20世紀(jì)建立起的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)治理架構(gòu)將迅速萎縮。屆時(shí)，政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人將需要極大的自我克制來(lái)維持國(guó)際合作，并防止向公開(kāi)地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的方向倒退。
Proving to their citizens that they can manage the COVID-19 crisis will buy leaders some political capital. But those who fail will find it hard to resist the temptation to blame others for their failure.
向公民們證明自己可應(yīng)對(duì)疫情危機(jī)將使領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人獲得一些政治資本，而那些無(wú)力管控疫情的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人只會(huì)極力推卸責(zé)任。
3A More China-Centric Globalization
更加以中國(guó)為中心的全球化
by Kishore Mahbubani馬凱碩（新加坡國(guó)立大學(xué)亞洲研究所特聘研究員）
The COVID-19 pandemic will not fundamentally alter global economic directions.It will only accelerate a change that had already begun: a move away from U.S.-centric globalization to a more China-centric globalization.
COVID-19的疫情不會(huì)從根本上改變?nèi)蚪?jīng)濟(jì)方向。它只會(huì)加速已經(jīng)開(kāi)始的變化：從以美國(guó)為中心的全球化轉(zhuǎn)向更以中國(guó)為中心的全球化。
Why will this trend continue? The American population has lost faith in globalization and international trade. Free trade agreements are toxic, with or without U.S. President Donald Trump. By contrast, China has not lost faith. Why not? There are deeper historical reasons. Chinese leaders now know well that China’s century of humiliation from 1842 to 1949 was a result of its own complacency and a futile effort by its leaders to cut it off from the world. By contrast, the past few decades of economic resurgence were a result of global engagement. The Chinese people have also experienced an explosion of cultural confidence. They believe they can compete anywhere.
為什么這種趨勢(shì)會(huì)持續(xù)下去？因?yàn)槊绹?guó)人對(duì)全球化和國(guó)際貿(mào)易失去了信心，不管有沒(méi)有美國(guó)總統(tǒng)唐納德·特朗普，美國(guó)人認(rèn)為自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定都是有害的。相比之下，中國(guó)并沒(méi)有喪失信心。這存在一些深層次的歷史原因。中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人很清楚，從1842年到1949年的百年屈辱是自滿和閉關(guān)鎖國(guó)的惡果。相比之下，中國(guó)過(guò)去幾十年的經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇是參與全球化的結(jié)果。中國(guó)人民也經(jīng)歷了文化自信的大爆發(fā)，更加相信自己的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。
Consequently, as I document in my new book, Has China Won?, the United States has two choices. If its primary goal is to maintain global primacy, it will have to engage in a zero-sum geopolitical contest, politically and economically, with China. However, if the goal of the United States is to improve the well-being of the American people—whose social condition has deteriorated—it should cooperate with China. Wiser counsel would suggest that cooperation would be the better choice.
因此，正如馬凱碩在《中國(guó)贏了嗎？》一書(shū)中提及美國(guó)將面臨兩種選擇。如果美國(guó)的首要目標(biāo)是保持全球領(lǐng)先地位，那么它將不得不與中國(guó)展開(kāi)一場(chǎng)政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)上的零和地緣政治競(jìng)賽。然而，如果美國(guó)的目標(biāo)是改善社會(huì)狀況不斷惡化下美國(guó)人民的福利，那么美國(guó)應(yīng)該與中國(guó)合作。
4
The History of COVID-19 Will Be Written by the Victors
新冠疫情的歷史將由勝利者書(shū)寫(xiě)
by John Allen約翰·艾倫（前美國(guó)海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)上將）
As it has always been, history will be written by the “victors” of the COVID-19 crisis. Every nation, and increasingly every individual, is experiencing the societal strain of this disease in new and powerful ways.
一如既往，新冠疫情危機(jī)的歷史將由勝利者書(shū)寫(xiě)。每個(gè)國(guó)家的越來(lái)越多的個(gè)體正以各種前所未有而令人沖擊的方式感受著這場(chǎng)疫情所帶來(lái)的社會(huì)緊張。
Inevitably, those nations that persevere—both by virtue of their unique political and economic systems, as well as from a public health perspective—will claim success over those who experience a different, more devastating outcome. To some, this will appear as a great and definitive triumph for democracy, multilateralism, and universal health care. To others, it will showcase the clear “benefits” of decisive, authoritarian rule.To some, this will appear as a great and definitive triumph for democracy. To others, it will showcase the clear “benefits” of authoritarian rule.
不可避免的是，那些憑借其獨(dú)特的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)體制抑或是公共衛(wèi)生政策觀點(diǎn)而得以保全的國(guó)家，將會(huì)對(duì)其余那些經(jīng)歷毀滅性打擊的國(guó)家宣告勝利。這將會(huì)是民主、多邊主義和全民醫(yī)保的偉大勝利。而對(duì)另一些國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō)，這將清楚地展現(xiàn)果斷的中央集權(quán)統(tǒng)治的好處。
Either way, this crisis will reshuffle the international power structure in ways we can only begin to imagine. COVID-19 will continue to depress economic activity and increase tension between countries. Over the long term, the pandemic will likely significantly reduce the productive capacity of the global economy, especially if businesses close and individuals detach from the labor force. This risk of dislocation is especially great for developing nations and others with a large share of economically vulnerable workers. The international system will, in turn, come under great pressure, resulting in instability and widespread conflict within and across countries.
不管怎樣，這次危機(jī)將以一種前所未有的方式將國(guó)際權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)重新洗牌。新冠疫情將持續(xù)抑制經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)并加劇國(guó)家間的緊張態(tài)勢(shì)。長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，在企業(yè)倒閉、勞動(dòng)力失業(yè)的情況下，這次疫情很可能重創(chuàng)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出能力。這種混亂的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家和其他貧窮工人比重較大的國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō)影響尤為巨大。國(guó)際體系將由此承受巨大的壓力，并導(dǎo)致國(guó)家內(nèi)部和國(guó)家間不穩(wěn)定且廣泛的沖突。
5
More Failed States
更多的失敗國(guó)家
by Richard N. Haass理查德·哈斯（美國(guó)對(duì)外關(guān)系委員會(huì)會(huì)長(zhǎng)）
Permanent is not a word I am fond of, as little or nothing is, but I would think the coronavirus crisis will at least for a few years lead most governments to turn inward, focusing on what takes place within their borders rather than on what happens beyond them. I anticipate greater moves toward selective self-sufficiency (and, as a result, decoupling) given supply chain vulnerability; even greater opposition to large-scale immigration; and a reduced willingness or commitment to tackle regional or global problems (including climate change) given the perceived need to dedicate resources to rebuild at home and deal with economic consequences of the crisis.
盡管理查德·哈斯并不喜歡用“持久”一詞作論斷，但他認(rèn)為新冠病毒危機(jī)至少會(huì)在幾年內(nèi)促使大多數(shù)國(guó)家內(nèi)顧，更加關(guān)注國(guó)內(nèi)事務(wù)，而非境外之事。哈斯預(yù)計(jì)，由于供應(yīng)鏈的脆弱性，國(guó)家將朝著選擇性的自給自足（以及隨之而來(lái)的脫鉤）邁出更大的步伐。國(guó)家還會(huì)表現(xiàn)出對(duì)大規(guī)模移民更強(qiáng)烈的反對(duì)。同時(shí)，鑒于資源需要被用于國(guó)內(nèi)重建和應(yīng)對(duì)這場(chǎng)危機(jī)的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，國(guó)家對(duì)處理地區(qū)或全球問(wèn)題（包括氣候變化）將具有更少的意愿或做出更少的承諾。
Many countries will have difficulty recovering, with state weakness and failed states becoming even more prevalent.
許多國(guó)家將難以從這場(chǎng)危機(jī)中恢復(fù)過(guò)來(lái)，國(guó)家貧弱與失敗國(guó)家將在世界上更加普遍。
I would expect many countries will have difficulty recovering from the crisis, with state weakness and failed states becoming an even more prevalent feature of the world. The crisis will likely contribute to the ongoing deterioration of Sino-American relations and the weakening of European integration. On the positive side, we should see some modest strengthening of global public health governance. But overall, a crisis rooted in globalization will weaken rather than add to the world’s willingness and ability to deal with it.
許多國(guó)家將難以從這場(chǎng)危機(jī)中恢復(fù)過(guò)來(lái)，國(guó)家貧弱與失敗國(guó)家將在世界上更加普遍。這場(chǎng)危機(jī)很可能會(huì)加劇大國(guó)之間的持續(xù)惡化以及歐洲一體化的衰退。就其積極一面來(lái)說(shuō)，全球公共衛(wèi)生治理可能會(huì)有所加強(qiáng)。但總的來(lái)說(shuō)，根植于全球化的危機(jī)將削弱而非增強(qiáng)世界應(yīng)對(duì)危機(jī)的意愿與能力。
6
The United States Has Failed the Leadership Test
美國(guó)未能通過(guò)這場(chǎng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力測(cè)試
by Kori Schake科里·舍克（美國(guó)國(guó)際戰(zhàn)略研究所副所長(zhǎng)）
The United States will no longer be seen as an international leader because of its government’s narrow self-interest and bungling incompetence.The global effects of this pandemic could have been greatly attenuated by having international organizations provide more and earlier information, which would have given governments time to prepare and direct resources to where they’re most needed. This is something the United States could have organized, showing that while it is self-interested, it is not solely self-interested.
由于美國(guó)政府的狹隘自私與無(wú)能為力，美國(guó)將不再被視為國(guó)際領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。這場(chǎng)疫情的全球影響本可以通過(guò)國(guó)際組織提供更加豐富有效的信息，以便給各國(guó)政府更多時(shí)間進(jìn)行準(zhǔn)備并調(diào)配資源到最需要的地方而被極大削弱。通過(guò)國(guó)際組織提供更加豐富有效的信息，以便給各國(guó)政府更多時(shí)間進(jìn)行準(zhǔn)備并調(diào)配資源到最需要的地方，這場(chǎng)疫情的全球影響本可以得到極大削弱。這也是美國(guó)本應(yīng)當(dāng)組織的事情，以此顯示美國(guó)雖自私自利但也不盡然如此。